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White on White: Anonymous Tips,
Reasonable Suspicion, and the
Constitution
By DAvID S. RUDSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
In Alabama v White,' the Supreme Court, in an opimon
written by Justice Byron White,2 held that an anonymous tip to
the police stating that a particular individual was engaged in cnm-
inal activity, when corroborated to some extent by independent
police investigation, provided "reasonable suspicion" to justify an
investigatory stop of that individual. Tlus Article argues that the
Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v White significantly re-
duces the protection afforded by the fourth amendment.
I. INVESTIGATORY STOPS
The Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio3 that a police officer,
acting without a warrant, can forcibly stop and briefly detain an
individual for investigatory purposes, although the officer lacks
probable cause for an arrest. 4 The Court concluded that although
an investigatory "stop," however brief, constitutes a "seizure"
* Professor of Law, IIT Clucago-Kent College of Law. B.S. 1968, Illinois; J.D. 1971,
Northwestern; LL.M. 1975, Illinois. Funding for this Article was provided by the Marshall
Ewell Research Fund at IrT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
2 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined Justice White's opinion. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
3 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968), construed in United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
The Terry Court also held that if an officer reasonably believes that the individual
with whom he is dealing "may be armed and presently dangerous," he can pat down the
outer clothing of the individual m an attempt to find weapons that could be used against
him. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30.
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within the meaning of the fourth amendment,' such a stop neces-
sarily requires swift action predicated upon on-the-scene observa-
tions by an officer and cannot as a practical matter be subjected
to the warrant procedure.6 The Court tested the police conduct by
the fourth amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures, balancing the governmental interest against
the degree of intrusion upon individual rights.7 It concluded that
the government's interest in crime prevention and detection out-
weighs the limited intrusion on an individual's personal security
caused by a brief investigatory stop.8 The Terry Court held that a
police officer may make an investigatory stop when he "observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." 9 As the
Court explained in Adams v Williams:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks
the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a cnme to occur
or a cnrminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it
may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate
response. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in
light of the facts known to the officer at the time. 0
U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
This amendment, designed to secure privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the government,
is "basic to a free society," and is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). By its very
terms, the fourth amendment applies only to "searches" and "seizures." An investigative
techmque that does not fall into either category does not need to meet the requirements of
the fourth amendment. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1985); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 136-37 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
7 Id. at 20-21.
S Id. at 27.
"Id. at 30.
Although Terry involved the stop of a pedestrian, the Court has applied the holding
of Terry to the stop of a motor vehicle and the brief detention of its occupants. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
226 (1985); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); United States v. Bngnom-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
10 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972).
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II. THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" STANDARD
A police officer cannot forcibly stop an individual for investi-
gatory purposes merely upon the basis of an "inchoate and un-
particularized suspicion or 'hunch."'1 1 Rather, under the "totality
of the circumstances-the whole picture-,"1 2 he must have a
"reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts' 13 that the partic-
ular individual in question "is, or is about to be, engaged in
cnrminal activity,"' 14 or that he "was involved in or is wanted in
connection with a completed felony."' 5
The Supreme Court attempted to explain this standard m United
States v Cortez:16
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); accord United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989).
12 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); accord Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8.
3 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 ("reason-
able suspicion"); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) ("articulable and
reasonable suspicion"); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) ("reasonable
suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts"); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5
(1984) (per cunam) ("articulable suspicion"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)
(plurality opinion) ("reasonable, objective grounds" and "articulable suspicion"); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per cunam) ("reasonable and articulable suspicion").
24 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; see also Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (crime occurring or
inunent threat of crime).
Several courts have held that the cnminal activity under investigation need not be a
felony. See State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 454-56 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (where there is "a
reasonable suspicion that unnunent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or
property has recently occurred"); State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d 388, 391 n.2 (Iowa 1986)
(at least for the offense of public intoxication), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1057 (1987); State v.
Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (reasoning that "the differ-
ence between felonies and misdemeanors is a legislative, not a constitutional distinction").
I" Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229; see also Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (stating that Terry
allowed seizure if person had committed or was about to commit a crime); Cortez, 449
U.S. at 417 n.2 (recognizing police right to stop if a person was wanted for a past crime).
The Hensley Court expressly left open the question "whether Terry stops to investigate
all past crimes, however serious, are permitted." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229. Several lower
courts have held that, at least under certain circumstances, a police officer can forcibly stop
an individual to investigate a completed misdemeanor. See G.B., 769 P.2d at 456-57 (stop
based on solid information may be permitted when the crime is not a felony); State v.
Stich, 399 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (where the misdemeanor was committed
in the "very recent past"); Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d at 357 (reasoning that "the difference
between felonies and misdemeanors is a legislative, not a constitutional distinction"). But
see Blaisdell v. Commissioner, 375 N.W.2d 880, 882 n.2, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that vehicle stops to investigate "completed" misdemeanors violate the fourth amendment;
stating, however, that courts should be hesitant to hold criminal conduct that occurred in
the recent past, such as the same day, to be "completed"), aff'd on other grounds, 381
N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1986).
2M Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421-22.
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The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield
a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which
must be present before a stop is pernussible. First, the assessment
must be based upon all of the circumstances. The analysis pro-
ceeds with various objective observations, information from po-
lice reports, if such are available, and. consideration of the modes
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From
these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deduc-
tions-inferences and deductions that might well elude an un-
trained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated
as such, practical people formulated certain common sense con-
clusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permit-
ted to do the same-and so are law enforcement officers. Finally,
the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms
of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed
in the field of law enforcement.
The second element contained in the idea that an assessment
of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the
concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that
the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdo-
ing. 17
The level of suspicion required for an investigatory stop is less
demanding than the probable cause required for a search and is
"considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance
of the evidence."' 8 Moreover, a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity can arise from wholly lawful conduct.19 In determnmng
whether reasonable suspicion exists in a given case, "the relevant
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,'
but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of
noncriminal acts.' '20
17 Id. at 418.
1S Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
19 Id. at 8-10; Reid, 448 U.S. at 441 (per cunam); see, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6,
22-23 (a plainclothes police officer with thirty-mne years' experience concluded that three
men he observed walking back and forth past a particular store were "casing" the store
for a robbery).
2Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983)).
In Sokolow, for example, the Court concluded that federal drug agents had reasonable
suspicion to stop the defendant following his arrival at Honolulu International Airport,
based upon the following facts: the defendant purchased two round-trip airline tickets
between Honolulu and Miami, paying $2,100 in cash from a large roll of $20 bills; the
name under which the defendant traveled did not match the name under which his telephone
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III. REASONABLE SUSPICION BASED UPON AN INFORMANT'S TP
Although Terry v Ohio2' involved a forcible stop based upon
the personal observations of a police officer, the Supreme Court
subsequently held in Adams v. Wiliam 22 that a forcible stop also
can be based upon an informant's tip. In Adams, a confidential
informant told a police officer that an individual seated in a nearby
automobile was carrying narcotics and had a gun at Ins waist.
Acting upon this information, the officer approached the auto-
mobile, tapped on the car window, and asked the occupant, Robert
Williams, to open the door. When Williams instead rolled down
the window, the officer reached into the vehicle and removed a
fully loaded revolver from Williams's waistband. 23 The officer ar-
rested Williams for unlawful possession of the pistol. Dunng a
search incident to the arrest, other police officers found substantial
quantities of heroin, on Williams's person and in his car, as well
as a machete and a second revolver. 24
In upholding the validity of the investigatory stop of Williams
and the subsequent seizure of Ins pistol,25 the Supreme Court
number was listed; the defendant's original destination was Miaim, a source city for illegal
drugs; the defendant stayed in Miami for only forty-eight hours, even though a round-trip
flight from Honolulu to Miaim takes twenty hours; and the defendant did not check any
of Ins luggage and appeared nervous during his trip. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 3; see also
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 677-79, 682 n.3 (concluding that law enforcement officers had reasonable
suspicion that the two defendants were engaged in trafficking marijuana when an officer in
an unmarked car observed the defendants' veicles-one of winch was a pickup truck with
a camper shell, a type of vehicle frequently used to transport large quantities of marijuana-
traveling in tandem for twenty miles in an area known to be frequented by drug traffickers;
the truck seemed to be heavily loaded; the windows of the camper were covered with quilted
bed-sheet material, rather than curtains; and the defendants took evasive actions and began
speeding as soon as a second law enforcement officer began following them in a marked
squad car). Cf. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441 (per curam) (concluding that a federal drug agent
did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant following his amval at the Atlanta
airport, even though the officer knew that the defendant had arrived from Fort Lauderdale,
a source city for cocaine, at a time of day when law enforcement activity is dimshed,
and that the defendant and his compamon apparently had no luggage other than their
shoulder bags and appeared to be trying to hide the fact that they were traveling together).
21 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
- 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
21 The Court indicated that a forcible stop occurred when Williams rolled down the
window of his car, because, in doing so, he did not act voluntarily. Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146 n.1 (1972).
24 Williams was convicted of illegal possession of a handgun and possession of heroin.
Id. at 144.
21 The Court also upheld the validity of the seizure of the heroin found during the
search incident to his arrest. Id. at 149.
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expressly rejected the argument that a stop and frisk can be based
only upon a police officer's firsthand observations. Instead, the
Court held that reasonable suspicion can be based upon informa-
tion supplied by another person,26 provided that the information
carries sufficient "indicia of reliability "27 The Court stated:
Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a
policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and
reliability One simple rule will not cover every situation. Some
tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either
warrant no police response or require further investigation before
a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in some
situations-for example, when the victim of a street crime seeks
immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or
when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime-
the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate
police response.2
The Court in Adams concluded that the informant's report con-
tained sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify an investigatory
stop of the vehicle's occupant. 29 The police officer knew the in-
formant, who previously had provided the police with reliable
information. 0 Furthermore, the information was immediately ver-
ifiable at the scene. Finally, under state law,31 the informant nght
have been subject to immediate arrest for making a false complaint
had the officer's investigation proven the tip incorrect.
IV ANONYMoUs TiPSTERS AND PROBABLE CAUSE
Since Adams v Williams3 2 involved an informant who was
personally known by the police officer who received the tip, the
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to discuss whether an anon-
ymous tip could supply "reasonable suspicion" for an investigatory
stop. The Court merely stated that "[tihis is a stronger case than
26 Id. at 146-47.
21 Id. at 147.
28-1d.
29 Id.
30 But, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opimon in Adams, the
information previously supplied by the informant had involved homosexual activity in the
local railroad station and had not even led to an arrest. Id. at 156 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 147 n.2; CoN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-168, repealed by 1969, P.A. 828 § 214 (a
"person who knowingly makes to any police officer a false report or a false complaint
alleging that a cnme or cnrmes have been committed" was guilty of a rmisdemeanor).
32 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip. ' 33 Several years
later, in Illinois v Gates,34 the Court dealt with the issue of
anonymous tips in the context of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant. The tip in Gates came in the form of an
anonymous letter to the police in Bloomingdale, Illinois, a suburb
of Chicago. The letter, which the police received by mail on May
3, 1978, stated that two residents of Bloonngdale, Sue and Lance
Gates, made their living selling drugs. It also said that Sue would
drive to Florida on May 3 to obtain over $100,000 worth of drugs,
that Lance would fly down a few days later to drive their car back,
while Sue flew home, and that they currently had over $100,000
worth of drugs in the basement of their house .3 5 The police pursued
11 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
After the Supreme Court's decision in Adams, lower courts regularly upheld investi-
gatory stops based upon anonymous tips. This was true even in cases m which the tipster
did not state how he had obtained his information. These courts typically concluded that
the police corroboration of facts contained in the tip-albeit innocent ones, rather than
facts raising a suspicion of criminal activity-provided sufficient "indicia of reliability" for
police action. See, e.g., United States v. Seelye, 815 F.2d 48, 51 (8th Cir. 1987) (an
anonymous informant reported that a described man in the hallway of an apartment building
was pointing a gun at people as they left a party); United States v. McBride, 801 F.2d
1045, 1046-48 (8th Cir. 1986) (an anonymous telephone caller reported that a man had just
left the caller's house with four ounces of heroin in a silver foreign Japanese-like car with
Illinois license plates and was heading toward a certain intersection), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1100 (1987); Hetiand v. State, 387 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1980) (per curam) (an anonymous
telephone caller reported that a named individual, whom she described, was on his way to
a particular bar to shoot someone), adopting State v. Hetland, 366 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); State v. Jernigan, 377 So. 2d 1222, 1224-25 (La. 1979) (an umdentified
telephone caller told the police that a described individual sitting in a specified bar was
armed with a gun), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 958 (1980); State v. Thomas, 542 A.2d 912, 913,
917-18 (N.J. 1988) (an anonymous informant reported that a man named Ike, who was
dressed in described clothing and was inside a particular bar, possessed illegal drugs); State
v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72, 73-74 (S.D. 1986) (an anonymous telephone caller reported
that he had been following a particular vehicle and that it was weaving all over the road);
cf. Strong v. State, 495 So. 2d 191, 192-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an
anonymous telephone caller's tip that there was a black man wearing dark clothing with a
handgun at a particular convemence store was too vague to justify an investigatory stop),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987); People v. Crea, 510 N.Y.S.2d 876, 879-80 (A.D. 2 Dept.
1987) (holding that an anonymous telephone call reporting that some children in the
neighborhood said that a woman was bound and gagged and screaming for help inside a
white van parked at a specified location did not justify an investigatory stop); State v.
Sieler, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275-76 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (an unknown telephone caller reported
that a drug transaction had just taken place in a car in a school parking lot).
462 U.S. 213 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
, The anonymous handwritten letter read:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who
strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they
live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condomimums. Most of their
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this tip and learned that Lance Gates had flown to West Palm
Beach, Florida, on May 5, and had gone to a motel room registered
to one Susan Gates. He left the motel the next morning with an
unidentified woman in an automobile bearing Illinois license plates,
which had been issued to im, and drove northbound on an inter-
state lughway frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. On
the basis of this information, the Bloomingdale police obtained a
warrant to search the Gateses' residence and their automobile.
When the Gateses returned to their home at 5:15 a.m. on May 7,
the police executed the warrant, finding about 350 pounds of
marijuana in the trunk of the car and marijuana, weapons, and
other contraband in the residence.3 6
In determining the validity of the warrant in Gates,37 the Su-
preme Court concluded that the anonymous letter, standing alone,
did not provide probable cause to believe contraband would be
found in the Gateses' automobile and home. The Court reasoned
that the letter provided "virtually nothing" from which the issuing
judge could conclude that its writer was either honest or his infor-
mation reliable and that it gave "absolutely no indication" of the
basis of the author's predictions concerning the cnininal activities
of the Gateses .3  Nevertheless, the Court held that the tip, when
taken in conjunction with the facts obtained by the law enforce-
ment officers through their independent investigation, supplied
probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. 9 The Court
buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she
leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back.
Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving
down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it
back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with
over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of
drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire
living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They
are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway in Condominiums
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 225 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
36 Id. at 225-27.
31 The trial court suppressed the items discovered during the searches, concluding that
the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to show probable cause. Id. at 227. Both the
Illinois Appellate Court, 403 N.E.2d 77 (Il. App. Ct. 1980), and the Supreme Court of
Illinois, 423 N.E.2d 887 (Ill. 1981), affirmed this decision.
11 Gates, 462 U.S. at 227.
31 Id. at 243-46.
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first found that Lance Gates's flight to Florida-a place well-
known as a source of illegal drugs-, his brief, overnight stay in
a motel, and his apparently immediate return north to Chicago in
the family car was suggestive of a prearranged drug run. The Court
then concluded that the judge that issued the warrant had properly
relied upon the anonymous letter. The corroboration of the letter's
predictions that the Gateses' car would be in Florida, that Lance
Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he
would drive the car north toward Bloomngdale, Illinois, indicated
that the informant's other assertions-including the claims regard-
ing the illegal activity-also were true. The Court noted that "the
anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to
easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip,
but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily pre-
dicted."' 4 The Court reasoned:
The letterwriter's accurate information as to the travel plans of
each of the Gateses was of a character likely obtained only from
the Gateses themselves, or from someone familiar with their not
entirely ordinary travel plans. If the informant had access to
accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly
conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable
information of the Gateses' alleged illegal activities.41
Prior to Gates, a magistrate or judge determining the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant or for a warrantless
search or arrest could consider hearsay information from an in-
formant only if it met the "two-pronged test" first articulated in
Aguilar v Texas12 and later refined in Spinelli v United States.43
That test required that the magistrate or judge be informed of
some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
40 Id. at 245.
41 Id.
. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
43 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Although both Aguilar and Spinelli involved probable cause determinations made by
magistrates upon applications for search warrants, "the guidelines for the valuation of
hearsay information in a probable cause setting are the same whether a magistrate is
contemplating the issuance of a warrant or whether a trial judge is weighing the propriety
of a policeman's actions without a warrant." Stanley v. State, 313 A.2d 847, 850 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974); accord Umted States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d
760 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Chatmon, 515 P.2d 530, 533 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
1990-91]
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reached his conclusions"4-that is, the basis of the informant's
knowledge 45-and, in addition, some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the person seeking the warrant concluded that
the informant was "credible" or his information "reliable.'"' Both
prongs of this test had to be met before a magistrate could rely
upon the informant's tip; 47 "an 'overkill' on one prong [would]
not carry over to make up for a deficit on the other prong."41
In Gates, however, the Court abandoned the "two-pronged
test ' 49 and substituted a "totality-of-the-circumstances" ap-
proach. ° Under this approach an "informant's 'veracity' or 'reli-
ability' and his 'basis of knowledge' are "relevant considerations"
" Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); accord Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 413 (1969).
" See State v. Yaw, 572 P.2d 856, 858 (Haw. 1977); Stanley, 313 A.2d at 851; State
v. Woodall, 666 P.2d 364, 365 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
46 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; accord Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 413.
Unlike the affidavit in Aguilar, the affidavit in Spinelli contained not only a report
from a confidential informant, but also a report of an independent FBI investigation
allegedly corroborating the informant's tip. In setting forth the analytical framework for
determining the proper weight to be given an informant's tip where that tip is a necessary
element in a finding of probable cause, the Court stated:
The informer's report must first be measured against Aguilar's standards
so that its probative value can be assessed. If the tip is found inadequate
under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information con-
tained in the hearsay report should then be considered. At this stage as well,
however, the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's
decision. He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain
parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy
as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration?
Aguilar is relevant at this stage of the inquiry as well because the tests it
establishes were designed to implement the long-standing principle that prob-
able cause must be determined by a "neutral and detached magistrate," and
not by "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime." A magistrate cannot be said to have properly discharged his
constitutional duty if he relies on an informer's tip which-even when partially
corroborated-is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's requirements
when standing alone.
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
41 Stanley, 313 A.2d at 858; Commonwealth v. Terra, 437 A.2d 29, 33-34 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981); State v. Fisher, 639 P.2d 743, 745 (Wash. 1982) (en banc), cert. dented, 457 U.S.
1137 (1982).
"' Stanley, 313 A.2d at 861.
49 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984)
(explaining the holding in Gates).
The Supreme Court in Gates noted that "the 'two-pronged test' ha[d] encouraged
excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, with undue attention being focused on
isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to the
magistrate." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234-35.
10 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
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in determimng the existence of probable cause,5' but "a deficiency
in one may be compensated for. . by a strong showing as to the
other, or by some other indicia of reliability "52 According to the
Court,
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.53
Even under this test, though, "[s]ufficient information must be
presented to the magistrate to allow that official to deternune
probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare
conclusions of others." 54
V. ANONYMOUS TIPSTERS AND REASONABLE SUSPICION
A. Alabama v White
The Supreme Court recently dealt with an anonymous tip in
the context of an investigatory stop. In Alabama v White,55 a
police officer received a telephone call at about 3:00 p.m. from an
anonymous person informing him that a Vanessa White would be
leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time
in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight
lens. She would be going to Dobey's Motel, which was located on
the Mobile Highway, and she would have in her possession about
an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attache case. Acting upon this
tip, the officer and his partner proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace
Apartments, where they observed a brown Plymouth station wagon
with a broken right taillight in the parking lot in front of the 235
building. Shortly thereafter, the officers observed a woman, who
st Id. at 233.
The Court referred to the informant's reliability, but it is clear from Aguilar, Spinelli,
and subsequent cases that it is-the reliability of the informant's information, rather than
the reliability of the informant himself, that serves as an alternative to the informant's
veracity or credibility.
,2 Id.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
- U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
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turned out to be Vanessa White, leave the 235 building with nothing
in her hands and enter the station wagon. The officers followed
the station wagon as it took the most direct route to Dobey's
Motel. The police stopped the vehicle at approximately 4:18 p.m.
on the Mobile Highway, just short of the motel. After being
informed that she had been stopped because she was suspected of
carrying cocaine in the car, White consented to a search of the
vehicle. The ensuing search revealed a locked brown attach6 case.
Upon request, White provided the combination to the lock. The
officers discovered marijuana in the attach6 case and arrested
White. While processing White at the stationhouse, they found
three milligrams of cocaine in her purse.56
Prior to her trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine,
White moved on fourth amendment grounds to suppress the evi-
dence found in her attach6 case and purse. The trial court demed
the motion, and the defendant pleaded guilty, reserving her right
to appeal the demal of her suppression motion. On appeal, the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed the conviction,
holding that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigatory stop of the defendant's car and that the marijuana
and cocaine were fruits of that unlawful stop and detention.57
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
state appellate court, holding that although the anonymous tip,
standing alone, would not have justified the forcible stop, 58 as
corroborated by the independent police work, the. tip exhibited
sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion for
the police to make the investigatory stop. 59 The Court acknowl-
edged that not every detail mentioned by the tipster was corrobo-
rated by the police, 60 but the officers did corroborate that a woman
left the 235 building, entered the particular vehicle described by
the caller, and departed within the time frame predicted by the
caller. The Court also found that the caller's prediction of the
woman's destination was significantly corroborated by the police.
It therefore concluded that because "significant aspects" of the
caller's predictions were verified by the police, particularly pred-
Alabama v. White, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2414-15 (1990).
11 Alabama v. White, 550 So. 2d 1074, 1080 (Ala. Crn. App. 1989), cert. denied,
550 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 1989).
White, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2414 (1990).
19 Id. at 2417.
60 The Court pointed out that the police did not verify the name of the woman they
saw leaving the building or the precise apartment from which she left. Id. at 2416.
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ictions as to future actions of a third party not easily predicted,
there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but
also that the caller was well enough informed to justify the inves-
tigatory stop.61
B. An Analysis of Alabama v White
An evaluation of the Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v.
White 2 must begin with the principle that the Constitution requires
that the determination of whether sufficient grounds for a search
or seizure exist must be made 'by a neutral and detached magis-
trate [or judge] instead of being judged by [an] officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"' 63 or "by
an umdentified informant." 64 Accordingly, a police officer seeking
a warrant or attempting to justify a warrantless search or seizure,
including an investigatory stop, cannot merely swear or affirm to
the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Rather,
the officer must relate to the magistrate or judge the facts and
circumstances upon which he bases his conclusion, so that the
judicial officer can determine whether they are sufficient to con-
stitute probable cause65 or reasonable suspicion. 6
" Id. at 2416-17.
- U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1964) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
-Id. at 115.
The initial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is made by
the issuing magistrate or judge. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 226 (1983);
Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112-15. When a police officer makes a warrantless search or seizure
(including an investigatory stop), it is the officer that makes the initial determination of the
emstence of probable cause, see, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), or, in the case of an investigatory stop, reasonable
suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968). A criminal defendant that was the victim of the search or seizure can seek to have
the initial determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion reviewed by a court by
moving to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the questioned police conduct. See,
e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. I (review of drug agents' determination of reasonable suspicion);
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (review of police officers' determination of probable
cause to arrest). However, under the so-called "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule, a court deciding a motion to suppress evidence might not reach the merits of the
fourth amendment claim if the court finds the evidence was obtained pursuant to a facially
valid warrant that was issued by a detached and neutral judge or magistrate but later
determined to be invalid. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
," Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Nathanson v. United States,
290 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1933).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
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Logically, the same rule must apply when a police officer seeks
to show probable cause or reasonable suspicion based upon infor-
mation received from an informant. The Supreme Court recognized
this in the probable cause context in Aguilar v Texas.67 As indi-
cated above, 68 the Court in Aguilar held that a police officer
seeking a warrant on the basis of information supplied by a con-
fidential informant must inform the magistrate or judge of some
of the underlying circumstances from which the informant reached
his conclusions (the informant's "basis of knowledge") and some
of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded
that the informant was "credible" or his information "reliable"
(the informant's "veracity"). The Aguilar Court correctly reasoned
that otherwise the police officer or the informant-not the magis-
trate or judge-would determine the existence of probable cause. 69
In the context of reasonable suspicion, however, the Supreme
Court has not taken the same approach. Without specifically an-
alyzing the informant's "basis of knowledge" or his "veracity,"
and while acknowledging that the tip may not have been sufficient
to justify an arrest or the issuance of a search warrant, in Adams
v Williams7 ° the Court concluded that the informant's tip carried
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify a forcible stop for
investigatory purposes.7 1 In essence, Adams applied a "totality-of-
the-circumstances" test for determining whether information from
an informant constitutes reasonable suspicion.72 In doing so, the
Court presaged its decision in Illinois v. Gates,73 where it aban-
doned the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar and Spinelli and adopted
a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to the determination of
probable cause.74
In addition to applying a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test,
the Supreme Court in Adams apparently held that a different, and
lesser, standard applies when determining whether hearsay infor-
mation from an informant can be considered on the issue of
reasonable suspicion.75 The Court made this explicit in White:
67 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
61 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
69 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15.
70 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
7' Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
72 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
3 462 U.S. 213 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
- Id. at 231-32, 238.
75 Adams, 407 U.S. at 147 ("[W]hile the Court's decisions indicate that this infor-
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Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than prob-
able cause not only m the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different m quantity or con-
tent than that required to establish probable cause, but also in
the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information
that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon
both the content of information possessed by police and its degree
of reliability Both factors-quantity and quality-are considered
in the "totality of the circumstances-the whole picture," (cita-
tion omitted) that must be taken into account when evaluating
whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a rela-
tively low degree of reliability, more information will be required
to establish the requsite quantum of suspicion than would be
required if the tip were more reliable.7 6
Although the Supreme Court can be criticized for abandoning
the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Gates, this Article will not do so.
Instead, it will focus upon two issues raised by the Court's decision
in White: first, the notion that less reliable evidence can be used
when determning the existence of reasonable suspicion than when
determining the existence of probable cause, and, second, the type
of independent police corroboration of an anonymous informant's
tip that will justify an investigatory stop.
1. Less Reliable Evidence
The Supreme Court's holding in White-that less reliable evi-
dence can be used when determining reasonable suspicion than
when determining probable cause-does not follow from its holding
in the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio.77 In Terry, the Court held
that a police officer can stop and frisk an individual on less than
probable cause to arrest. The Court reasoned that because a stop-
and-frisk constitutes less of an intrusion upon individual liberty
than an arrest, such a procedure can be undertaken where the
quantum of evidence is such that there is less of a probability of
criminal activity than is necessary to effect an arrest.78 However,
mant's unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant,
(citation omitted) the information earned enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's
forcible stop of Williams.").
White, 110 S. Ct. at 2416.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
71 Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-27.
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the Court in no way indicated that "reasonable suspicion" could
be based upon less reliable evidence than probable cause. Indeed,
Terry involved the firsthand observations of a police officer, not
information from an informant. The reliability of the information
therefore was not really at issue, because the officer was under
oath when he related his observations to the court at the pretrial
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized
during the stop-and-frisk. A close reading of Terry clearly indicates
that the Court merely reduced the quantum of evidence necessary
for an investigatory stop; the Court did nothing to alter the quality
of evidence necessary to justify such a seizure.
Logic dictates that a judge should not be allowed to rely upon
hearsay information that does not meet some imnmum standard
of "reliability " To illustrate, suppose a police officer receives a
tip that X is standing on a particular street comer selling cocaine.
No one would doubt that even under the Gates test that tip, by
itself, does not provide probable cause to arrest X. Without some
indication that the tip is reliable, no reason exists to give it any
weight whatsoever. The same must be true if the issue is whether
the officer has reasonable suspicion to forcibly stop X for inves-
tigatory purposes. Even though only the lesser standard of reason-
able suspicion, rather than probable cause, must be met to justify
the brief seizure of X's person, the tip is no more reliable in the
latter context than in the former, and hence no more deserving of
any weight.
Assume that the tip also stated that X is approximately twenty-
five years old, stands about six feet tall, has black hair and a
neatly trimmed beard, is wearing a red shirt and blue jeans, and
keeps Ins supply of cocaine in the trunk of his 1989 Mercedes Benz
automobile, which is parked nearby Even if the police went to the
particular street corner and observed X wearing the described cloth-
ing and standing next to the described automobile, the fact that
the tip contained more detail than the first one and that the police
corroborated some of the tip's innocent details does not show that
the tip is sufficiently reliable to allow a judge or magistrate to rely
upon the tip in concluding that probable cause exists to believe
that X is selling cocaine from the trunk of his automobile. 79 Noth-
"But cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (an informant who had
previously proved to be reliable told the police that he had just observed an individual
named "Bandit" sell narcotics from the trunk of his car and that "Bandit" had told hun
that additional narcotics were in the trunk).
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ing indicates how the informant obtained his information that X
was selling cocaine, and the details corroborated by the police were
merely "easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time
of the tip."8 °
If this tip is not reliable enough to be considered for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to arrest X
or search his automobile, why should it be deemed reliable enough
to be considered when determining the existence of reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop of X? An unreliable tip is no
more worthy of belief in the latter context than in the former, and
this is true despite the lower quantity of evidence required to justify
an investigatory stop. It is difficult to understand what the Court
meant in White when it stated that where "a tip has a relatively
low degree of reliability, more information will be required to
establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required
if the tip were more reliable.''81
2. Sufficient Corroboration by the Police
The second problem with the Supreme Court's decision in
White is its conclusion that the anonymous tip, as corroborated by
the independent police investigation, exhibited sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify the investigatory stop of the defendant's au-
tomobile. As indicated above, the police officers corroborated that
a woman left the 235 building, entered the vehicle described by the
caller, and departed within the time frame predicted by the caller.
The Court also found that the caller's prediction of the woman's
destination was significantly corroborated by the police. 2 The Court
reasoned that "because an informant is shown to be right about
some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has
alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in
criminal activity ",83 The Court found it particularly important that
the caller predicted the woman's future behavior According to the
Court, this "demonstrated inside information-a special familiarity
with [the woman's] affairs." ' The Court continued:
30 Gates, 462 U.S. at 245.
81 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2416.
The Court acknowledged that the police officers stopped the woman "just short of
Dobey's Motel and did not know whether she would have pulled m or continued on past
it." However, the Court pointed out that "the four-mile route driven by the respondent,"
despite involving several turns, "was the most direct route possible to Dobey's Motel." Id.
at 2417.
"1 Id., relying upon Gates, 462 U.S. at 244.
White, 110 S. Ct. at 2417.
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The general public would have had no way of knowing that [the
defendant] would shortly leave the building, get in the described
car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey's Motel. Because
only a small number of people are generally privy to an indivi-
dual's itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person
with access to such information is likely to also have access to
reliable information about that individual's illegal activities."s
Under certain circumstances, one cannot quibble with the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in White. For example, suppose an anon-
ymous informant telephones the police one afternoon and tells
them that at 10:30 that evening a woman named Hester Prynne,
whom he describes in detail, will leave her house at 1000 West Elm
Street carrying an attach6 case filled with money and take a number
36 bus to a tavern named Bottoms Up, a known hangout for drug
dealers, where she will give her attach6 case to a man named Slim,
whom the informant describes in detail. Suppose further that the
informant says that Slim will then give Prynne the key to a red
1990 Mercedes Benz, which will be parked in the alley behind the
bar and which will contain a large amount of cocaine in a brown
duffle bag in the trunk. If the police follow up this tip and observe
the described woman leave her house at the predicted time carrying
an attach6 case, take a number 36 bus to Bottoms Up, give the
attach6 case to the described man in exchange for a car key, and
then go to the alley behind the tavern and remove a brown duffle
bag from the trunk of a red 1990 Mercedes Benz automobile, it
would be difficult to conclude that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop the woman for investigatory purposes. 86 The fact
that the informant accurately predicted the individual's somewhat
unusual future behavior reasonably allows one to conclude that
"because [he] is shown to be right about some things, he is prob-
ably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim
that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity "87
On the other hand, such a conclusion cannot reasonably be
reached when the future behavior predicted by the informant is
not at least somewhat unusual. The following example shows the
fallacy of the Court's reasoning in White. Each fall semester for
the past seven years I have taught a class that begins at 8:30 a.m.
Each morning at roughly the same time I leave my house carrying
95 Id.
16 Indeed, the police might even have probable cause to arrest the woman.
White, 110 S. Ct. at 2417, relying upon Gates, 462 U.S. at 244.
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my worn out leather briefcase, drive my car to the train station,
and take the same commuter train to downtown Chicago, arriving
at the law school building at approximately 7:45 a.m. I am one of
millions of people that leave their residences at about the same
time every day, carrying briefcases and heading for destinations
known to their neighbors. 8 However, as Justice Stevens pointed
out in his dissenting opimon in White, it is unlikely that my
neighbors, or the neighbors of these millions of other people, know
what the briefcase contains.8 9 Thus, it follows that "[a]n anony-
mous neighbor's prediction about somebody's time of departure
and probable destination is anything but a reliable basis for assum-
ing that the commuter is in possession of an illegal substance." '9
Yet, this is what the Supreme Court held in White.
CONCLUSION
Under the Supreme Court's holding in Alabama v White,91
any person with a bit of knowledge about another individual can
make that individual the target of a prank, or, if he harbors a
grudge against the individual, can maliciously attempt to mconven-
ience and embarrass him, by formulating a tip about that individual
similar to the one in White and then anonymously passing it on
to the policeY2 Moreover, "every citizen is subject to being seized
and questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the
warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting what-
ever conduct the officer just observed." 93 As Justice Stevens con-
cluded in his dissenting opimon in White, that decision makes a
"mockery" of the protection afforded by the fourth amendment.9
- White, 110 S. Ct. at 2417 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id.
90 Id. at 2417-18.
9- - U.S. -, i10 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
92 Id. at 2418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id.
Justice Stevens properly recognized that "[flortunately, the vast majority of those in
our law enforcement community would not adopt such a practice." Id.
%Id.
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